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Abstract
There are many factors that inﬂuence the day-ahead market bidding strategies of a
generation company (GenCo) in the current energy market framework. Environmental
policy issues have become more and more important for fossil-fuelled power plants
and they have to be considered in their management, giving rise to emission limita-
tions. This work allows investigating the inﬂuence of the emission reduction plan, and
the incorporation of the derivatives medium-term commitments in the optimal gener-
ation bidding strategy to the day-ahead electricity market. Two different technologies
have been considered: the coal thermal units, high-emission technology, and the com-
bined cycle gas turbine units, low-emission technology. The Iberian Electricity Market
(MIBEL) and the Spanish National Emission Reduction Plan (NERP) deﬁnes the en-
vironmental framework to deal with by the day-ahead market bidding strategies. To
address emission limitations, some of the standard risk management methodologies
developed for ﬁnancial markets, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-
at-Risk (CVaR), have been extended giving rise to the new concept of Conditional
Emission at Risk (CEaR). This study offers to electricity generation utilities a math-
ematical model to determinate the individual optimal generation bid to the wholesale
electricity market, for each one of their generation units that maximizes the long-run
proﬁts of the utility abiding by the Iberian Electricity Market rules, as well as the en-
vironmental restrictions set by the Spanish National Emissions Reduction Plan. The
economic implications for a GenCo of including the environmental restrictions of this
National Plan are analyzed, and the effect of the NERP in the expected proﬁts and
optimal generation bid are analyzed.
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1. Introduction
Due to the constantly increasing pollution of the earth’s atmosphere, in recent years
emission control has become a matter of paramount importance. Nowadays world
energy systems are highly dependent on fossil fuels (such as coal, oil and gas formed
from the organic remains of prehistoric plants and animals). The share of fossil fuels in
the world’s energy production is more than 85% and in electricity generation more than
60% [1]. Although they provide a reliable and affordable source of energy, the use of
fossil-fuelled power plants harm the global ecosystem by emitting into the atmosphere
noxious gases and toxic substances, causing the greenhouse effect, which is thought to
be responsible for climate change.
The EU sets limits for emissions of pollutants from large combustion plants through
the so called National Emission Reduction Plan (NERP) (Directive 2001/80/EC [2]).
The impact of the NERP on the power industry appears to be very signiﬁcant and there
is a real need for power companies to ﬁnd new strategies to optimally integrate these
new emission limits in their energy’s market bid strategy. In this regard, NERP has
to be necessarily and explicitly considered in the elaboration of the generation units’
optimal sale bid to the wholesale electricity market, and this is the main commitment
of this work.
1.1. The Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL)
An important factor to determine the efﬁciency of electricity markets is the speciﬁc
market structure and trading rules, such as regulations, applied in each speciﬁc market.
The Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL) is the result of a joint initiative of the Govern-
ments of Portugal and Spain to integrate their markets. The generation companies have
to make daily bids to sell its electricity through the wholesale market, while distribution
companies perform an energy demand. This market is organized by the Iberian Mar-
ket Operator of Energy (OMIE, by its Spanish initials) who has to match supply with
demand in real time. Nowadays the day-ahead market (DAM) (short-term mechanism)
is the market where the most important part of the electricity demand is negotiated
(78% in the case of the MIBEL), explaining why ﬁnding the optimal bid to the DAM
is of utmost signiﬁcance in the daily operation of any GenCo. However DAM is not
only the main physical energy market of the MIBEL, in terms of the amount of traded
energy, but also the mechanism thought which other energy products, as bilateral and
futures contracts (medium term mechanisms), are integrated into the energy production
system. Current electricity markets are organized not only around the short-term spot
energy market but also around a variety of mid-term physical and ﬁnancial products, as
future and bilateral contracts, that each generation unit has to integrate in the sale bid
submitted to the market operator following the speciﬁc rules of each national electricity
market.
The DAM of day D consists of a series of twenty-four hourly auctions which are
cleared simultaneously between 10:00h and 10:30h of the previous day (D-1). Selling
and buying agents must submit their sale/purchase bids to each auction before 10:00h
of D-1. Both sale and purchase bids are composed of up to 24 price-energy pairs with
non-increasing price values, and each agent is unaware of the bids of the other agents.
The clearing price λDt of each hourly auction for time t is determined by the intersection
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Figure 1: Market clearing for a certain hour: intersection of the aggregated offer and
demand curves.
of the aggregated offer and demand curves: Fig. 1 . All the sale/purchase bids with a
lower/greater bid price are matched and will be remunerated at the same clearing price
λDt , whichever the original bid price.
Bilateral contracts (BC) are agreements between a GenCo and a qualiﬁed consumer
to provide a given amount of electrical energy at a stipulated price along with a deliv-
ering period. The agreements terms, namely: the energy, the price and the delivered
period, are negotiated several days before the DAM, and the energy that is destined to
the BC cannot be included in the DAM. Moreover, accordingly to the MIBEL rules,
the DAM bid of each unit must include the whole available energy not allocated to the
BC. This fact makes the optimal sale bid and the optimal BC’s dispatching mutually
dependents, coupling both problems. From the point of view of the GenCo, a BC rep-
resents a scheduled load curve to be delivered, chargeable at a ﬁxed price, that has to
be optimally dispatched among the GenCo’s units.
A future contract (FC) is an exchange-traded derivative that represents agreements
to buy/sell some underlying asset in the future at a speciﬁed price [3]. The DAM’s
operator demands every GenCo to commit the quantity designed to each FC through
the DAM bidding of a given sets of generation units. This commitment is done through
a sale offer with a bid price of 0e/MWh, the so called price acceptance offer. All price
acceptant offers will be matched (i.e. accepted) in the clearing process, i.e., the energy
shall be produced and will be remunerated at the DAM spot price.
1.2. EU National Emission Reduction Plan (NERP)
The EU envisages a Community Strategy to combat acidiﬁcation within the EU.
One of the main objectives of the strategy is ”not to exceed, at any time, critical loads
and levels” of certain acidifying pollutants such as SO2 and NOx, so that both, people
and ecosystems are protected effectively against the risks of air pollution. The EU’s
NERP directive (Directive 2001/80/EC [2]) applies to combustion plants (technical
apparatus in which fuels are oxidized in order to use the heat thus generated) with a
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rated thermal input equal to or greater than 50MW, irrespective of the type of fuel used
(solid, liquid or gaseous). This directive limits the amount of sulphur dioxide (SO2),
nitrogen oxides (NOx) emitted form large combustion plants each year. Following
this commitments, the Spanish public administration launched in 2004 the Spanish
National Emissions Reduction Plan (NERP, Real Decreto 430/2004 [4]). The Spanish
NERP imposes, for the period 2008-15, a global reduction of 81% of SO2 and 15% of
NOx emissions, compared to emissions in 2001.
1.3. Generation Units
In the wholesale electricity market there are a variety of units available for generat-
ing electricity, and each has its own characteristics. This work considers a GenCo with
a set of coal thermal units (high emission technology) and combined cycle gas turbines
(CCGT) generation units (low emission technology).
Thermal generation units have been part of the energy story for nearly ﬁfty years.
Thermal energy is generated by burning coal, natural gas, oil, or the combustion of
diesel. In thermal power plants electricity is generated by burning fossil fuels such
as coal, natural gas, or petroleum (oil). Fuel (coal for this study) and compressed
air are mixed in a combustion chamber and ignited. This combustion produces heat
that is used to heat water, which turns into steam, and spins a steam turbine rotor
which drives an electrical generator to produce electricity. Unfortunately, complete
conversion of fuel into energy is no possible. Consequently, fuel gas and cooling water
from combustion of the fossil fuels are discharged into the air.
The combined cycle gas turbine units [5] represent a combination of combustion
and steam turbines within a power plant. The CCGT plants employ more than one
thermodynamic cycle. Water is heated and turns into steam, the heat captured from the
combustion turbine exhaust gas, is used in the heat recovery steam generator and spins a
steam turbine which consequently drives an electrical generator to produce electricity.
This additional electricity improves the efﬁciency of electricity generation [6]. Cur-
rently, in Europe most of the new generating unit installations are CCGT units. They
are between 20 and 30 % more efﬁcient than thermal power plants, and can reach up to
60 % of efﬁciency. They are fast response units, which can be a quite decisive feature
in facing ﬂuctuations in the load and generation of the whole electricity production sys-
tem. Moreover they are less climate-damaging as they don’t produce SO2 emissions at
all, and the NOx emissions of a CCGT plant are negligible in comparison with that of
thermal units.
1.4. Literature review
The most important part of the published works concerning the relation between the
energy production and the pollutant emissions have been devoted to study the impact of
CO2 emissions trading in the power industry, specially through mid-term ([7, 8, 9]) but
also short-term ([10]) models. Although the NERP modiﬁes substantially the shape of
the optimal bid strategy of an electricity producer quite few attention has been given in
the bibliography to the optimal generation bid strategies under SO2 and NOx emission
limits. Most of the research production in relation with SO2 and NOx has been long-
term studies of different aspects of the impact of the SO2 and NOx emissions reduction
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in the wholesale electricity production system ([11, 12, 13]). Among the few papers
that studies the optimal generation under emission limits, [14] develops a load dispatch
model to minimize the NOx emissions taking the fuel cost and stochastic wind power
availability as constraints, disregarding the electricity market. The model in [15] con-
siders a deterministic unit commitment of both thermal and combined cycle units that
minimizes the generation (fuel) costs satisfying simple bounds to the SO2 and NOx
emissions. A quite common approach in several recent papers to the handling of emis-
sion limits are multiobjective optimization techniques where both the proﬁt and emis-
sions are minimized [16, 17], sometimes with additional emissions limit constraints
[18]. Despite the interest of all these studies it is worth mentioning that none of them
can be considered as optimal-bid models, as their formulation doesn’t incorporate the
bid rules of the electricity market, limiting the inﬂuence of the electricity market to the
expression of the total proﬁts either through deterministic forecasted electricity prices
[16, 17, 18] or spot price scenarios [19].
1.5. Contribution
This work presents a new stochastic programming model to cope with the optimal
generation bid to the next day auctions of the MIBEL day-ahead market (DAM) taking
into account the SO2 and NOx emission limits of the Spanish NERP. We consider a
price taker GenCo with a set of thermal coal and CCGT generation units subject to
SO2 and NOx emissions limits. The objective is to ﬁnd the generation scheduling
and sales bid of each one of the generators that maximize the expected value of the
net proﬁt of a Genco including the start-up, shut-down and generation costs together
with the incomes from the day-ahead market, futures and bilateral contracts. Several
characteristics distinguish this paper from the previous works in this area. Contrary
to other studies, our model consider the ex-ante negotiated Futures Contracts (FC)
and Bilateral Contracts (BC) of the GenCo, that are integrated in the optimal bidding
strategy according to the MIBEL directives and provides the optimal generation bid
for each one of the generation units assuming the optimal offer curve model developed
in [20, 21]. Moreover, the day-ahead electricity market bid with futures and bilateral
contracts model (DAMB-FBC) proposed in [21] has been improved in the present work
through the formulation of the CCGTs unit commitment modelization introduced in
[22] together with the explicit consideration of the NERP emissions limits through a
new speciﬁc measure of risk called Conditional Emission-at-Risk (CEaR), which is
one of the most important contributions of this paper. The resulting model for the
optimal day-head market bid with emission risk (DAMB-ER) has been validated with
real data from generation units operating in the MIBEL and with real prices from the
Spanish day-ahead market and used to study the impact of the Spanish NERP directives
onto the optimal generation bid and expected utilities’ proﬁt. The results can be easily
extrapolated to any country with similar NERP regulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the pro-
posed day-ahead market bid model with emission risk (DAMB-ER). In section 3 a case
study with real data of the MIBEL is solved and analyzed. Finally section 4 presents
the conclusions of the work.
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2. Emission Risk Constrained Model for the Optimal Electricity Generation Bid
As a consequence of the deregulation of the countrywide energy production sys-
tem through the settlement of liberalized electricity markets, the price of electricity
has become a signiﬁcant risk factor because it is unknown at the moment when gen-
eration companies have to take operational decisions. This means that the market
price has to be considered as a random variable whose realization is only known once
the market has been cleared. Stochastic programming [23] provides a powerful and
well established methodology to tackle with this uncertainty incorporating in a single
mathematical optimization model the available statistical information on the relevant
random variables. In this section we begin with a brief description of the so called
day-ahead market bid model with futures and bilateral contracts (DAMB-FBC), a two-
stage stochastic optimization model recently developed in [21] and [22] which allows a
GenCo to optimally decide the unit commitment of its generation units, the economic
dispatch of the bilateral and futures contracts, and the optimal generation bid to the
day-ahead market. Model (DAMB-FBC) is then extended in the second part of the
section to cope with the Spanish NERP through a new emission risk measure called
Conditional Emission at Risk.
2.1. Base model: optimal day-ahead market bid with futures and bilateral contracts
The basic day-ahead market bid model with futures and bilateral contracts (DAMB-
FBC) considered in this work was developed in [21] and subsequently extended in
[22] to include combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT)units. Lets consider a price-taker
GenCo owning a set of thermal generation units I and a set CC units that bid to the
t ∈ T = {1, 2, .., 24} hourly auctions of the DAM. Each one of the different operation
modes of the CCGT units described in section 1.3 is considered as an pseudo-unit,
being P the set of pseudo-units of all the CCGT units considered (see [22] for more
details). As a consequence, the total set of generation units considered by the model is
U = I ∪ P , and the parameters for the generation unit i ∈ U are:
• cbi ,cli,cqi : constant, linear and quadratic coefﬁcients of the generation costs func-
tion ([e], [e/MWh] and [e/MWh2] respectively).
• P i,P i: upper and lower bounds on the energy generation: [MWh].
• coni ,coffi : start-up and shut-down costs [e].
• toni ,toffi : minimum operation and minimum idle time [h].
• st0i : Number of hours the unit has been on (st0i > 0) or off (st0i < 0) previous to
the ﬁrst time period.
The parameters deﬁning a base load physical futures contract j ∈ F are:
• Ij ∈ U : the set of generation units allowed to cover the FC j: .
• LFj : the amount of energy [MWh] to be procured each interval of the delivery
period by the set Ij of generation units to cover contract j.
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• λFj : the price of contract j [e/MWh].
And the parameters deﬁning a base load bilateral contract k ∈ B are:
• LBtk: the amount of energy [MWh] to be procured during hour t of the delivery
period by the set of available generation units to cover the BC k.
• λBk : the price of the contract k [e/MWh].
The random variable λDt , the clearing price of the t
th hourly auction of the DAM, is
represented in the two-stage stochastic model by a set of scenarios s ∈ S , each one with
its associated clearing price for each DAM auction λD,st , t ∈ T and the corresponding
probability P s [24].
The ﬁrst-stage (here and now) variables of model (DAMB-FBC) are, for every time
period t ∈ T and generation unit i ∈ U :
• uti ∈ {0, 1}: the unit commitment binary variables, expressing the on-off oper-
ating status of the ith unit.
• cuti, cdti: the start-up/shut-down costs variables [e].
• qti: the price acceptant offer bid [MWh].
• ftij : the scheduled energy for futures contract j ∈ F [MWh].
• bti: the scheduled energy for bilateral contract [MWh].
Finally, the second stage (wait and see) variables are, for each t ∈ T , generation unit
i ∈ U under scenario s ∈ S .:
• gsti: the total generation under scenario s [MWh].
• psti: the matched energy in the day-ahead market under scenario s [MWh].
Considering the parameters and variables described below, the (DAMB-FBC) model
is deﬁned in [21] as:
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(DAMB-FBC)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max h(u, cu, cd, g, p, b, f)
s.t.:∑
i∈Ij
ftij = L
F
j j ∈ F , t ∈ T (1a)
∑
i∈U
bti =
∑
k∈B
LBtk t ∈ T (1b)
ftij ≥ 0 i ∈ U , j ∈ F , t ∈ T (1c)
0 ≤ bti ≤ Piuti i ∈ U , t ∈ T (1d)
qti ≥
∑
j|i∈Ij
ftij i ∈ U , t ∈ T (2a)
qti + bti ≥ Piuti i ∈ U , t ∈ T (2b)
psti + bti ≤ Piuti i ∈ U , t ∈ T , s ∈ S (2c)
qti ≤ psti i ∈ U , t ∈ T , s ∈ S (2d)
gsti = bti + p
s
ti i ∈ U , t ∈ T , s ∈ S (3a)
Piuti ≤ gsti ≤ P iuti i ∈ U , t ∈ T , s ∈ S (3b)
cu, cd, u ∈ PUC (4)
where the interpretation of the different set of constraints is as follows:
• (1a)-(1d): guarantees the coverage of both the physical futures and bilateral con-
tracts obligations.
• (2a)-(2d): incorporates in the model the MIBEL’s rules through which the ener-
gies LFj and L
B
tk of the futures and bilateral contracts are integrated in the day-
ahead market bid of a generation unit. The ﬁrst rule is that if generator i ∈ U
contributes with ftij MWh at period t to the coverage of the FC j, then the en-
ergy ftij must be offered to the pool for free embedded into the price acceptance
sale bid (2a). The second rule establishes that if generator i ∈ U contributes with
bti MWh at period t to the coverage of any of the BCs, then only the remaining
production capacity P i − bti can be bid to the DAM (constraints (2b) and (2c)).
• (3a),(3b): deﬁnes the total generation level of a given unit i, gsti, as the addition
of the allocated energy to the BC, plus the matched energy in the DAM, and
restricts the total generation output to be gsti ∈ {0} ∪ Pi, P i.
• (4): restricts the unit commitment variables (those related with the on-off state of
each generation unit) to belong to the feasible unit commitment polyhedron PUC .
This feasible polyhedron contains all the values of the binary unit commitment
variables u that satisﬁes the minimum operation and minimum idle time ton and
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toff , the initial state s0, and deﬁnes conveniently the value of the start-up/shut-
down costs variables cu, cd. The linear constraints that deﬁne this polyhedron
are quite intricate and has been omitted here for the sake of clarity. The detailed
formulation of these constraints can be found in [22].
Finally, the objective function h of the model accounts for the expected value of
the total proﬁt obtained by the GenCo, and is represented by the following expression:
h(u, cu, cd, g, p, b, f) =EλD [profit] =
= |T |
[∑
k∈F
λFk L
F
k
]
+
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈B
λBCtj L
BC
tj (5a)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
[
cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
iuti
]
(5b)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
c∈C
[
cutPc(1) + c
u
tPc(2) +
∑
i∈Pc
cbiuti
]
(5c)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈U
∑
s∈S
P s
[
λD,st p
s
ti−(cligsti+cqi (gsti)2)
]
(5d)
where:
• (5a): corresponds to the incomes of the FCs and the BCs, where λFk , LFk and
λBCtj , L
BC
tj are the prices and energies of FCs and BCs respectively. Both the en-
ergy and price of these contracts has been ﬁxed long before the moment when the
bid to the day-ahead market is being decided, and then this is a known constant
term in our objective function.
• (5b): accounts for the on/off ﬁxed cost of the unit commitment of the thermal
units. This term is independent of the realization of the random variable λDt . c
b
i
are the constant coefﬁcients of the generation costs (e).
• (5c): CC’s start-up and ﬁxed generation costs. Only start-up costs are associated
to the PU, and no cost is associated to the transition from state 2 to state 1. This
term does not depend on the realization of the random variable λD.
• (5d): represents the expected value of the beneﬁts from the day-ahead market,
where P s is the probability of scenario s. The term between brackets corre-
sponds to the expression of the quadratic generation costs with respect to the
total generation of the unit, gsti.
2.2. Conditional Emission at Risk (CEaR)
The Spanish National Emission Reduction Plan imposes limits SO2 and NOx
[kg/day] to the joint emission of the thermal units (CCGT units are excluded). Of
course these limitations could be included in the model (DAMB-FBC) by simply im-
posing an emission limit at every scenario s through the following set of constraints
[22]:
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∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti ≤ SO2 s ∈ S (6)
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eNOxi g
s
ti ≤ NOx s ∈ S (7)
where, as usual, the emissions of a thermal unit are assumed to be linear w.r.t. the total
generation gsti with emission coefﬁcients e
SO2
i and e
NOx
i [kg/MWh] that depend on the
generation technology. Actually, this formulation would be a simple stochastic exten-
sion of the deterministic approach adopted by the few previous works that incorporate
explicitly the emission limits [15, 18] by imposing an upper bound to the accumulated
emissions along the complete optimization horizon. This approach, although valid is
quite restrictive as it forces the optimal bid to abide by the NERP rules even in the most
extremes (less likely) scenarios.
The risk management ideas developed for the ﬁnancial markets offers a new and
more ﬂexible approach to address the SO2 and NOx emission constraints. Risk man-
agement is the theory about how to handle risks. Classical risk management methods
in portfolio optimization theory, include Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-
at-Risk (CVaR) [25, 26]. By analogy to the CVaR concept developed to monitor
losses within pre-speciﬁed tolerances, a new concept, the Conditional Emission-at-
Risk (CEaR) is proposed in this work as a tool to measure and control the risk of
violating the NERP emission limits. To this end, we start by formulating the following
constraints:
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti − SO2 ≤ MSO2ys s ∈ S (8)
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti − SO2 ≥ MSO2(ys − 1) s ∈ S (9)
∑
s∈S
P sys ≤ γ (10)
The ﬁrst two equations (8) and (9) conveniently classify the scenarios in which the
SO2 emission exceed the limit. ys, s ∈ S is a binary variable that takes value 1 if
the emissions are higher than SO2 and 0 otherwise, and parameter MSO2 is an upper
bound of the emission violation, that is:
−MSO2 ≤
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti − SO2 ≤ MSO2
Of course, a trivial valid value for MSO2 could be |T |∑i eSO2i P i. Equation (10),
in turn, limits the joint probability of those scenarios exceeding the upper bound SO2.
Thus, instead of imposing an emission limit at every individual scenario s, this ap-
proach allows exceeding the limit, with a given probability not greater than γ. It is
worth mentioning that when γ = 0 constraints (8)- (10) are equivalent to constraints
(6), that is, to impose that no scenario can exceed the emission limit. Furthermore,
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taking γ = 1 is equivalent to not to impose any limit at all (and then to revert to the
base model (DAMB-FBC)).
The above three constraints: (8) - (10) are the base to the development of a CVaR-
like model to limit the average amount by which the emissions can exceed the limit. We
will develop, by analogy with the CVaR function, the so-called Conditional Emission-
at-Risk (CEaR) in order to establish a new measure of risk associated with the ex-
pected value of SO2 violation. To this end, let’s deﬁne ﬁrst for every scenario s, a
new set of variables eSs whose value will be equal to the value of the SO2 emissions
(
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti) if the emission of scenario s exceed the limit (that is, if y
s = 1), or
0 if the emission of scenario s is below the limit (that is, whenever ys = 0):
eSs =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti if y
s = 1
0 if ys = 0
s ∈ S
Eq. (11) - (13) below express variables eSs in a way amenable to the optimization
model:
eSs −
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti ≤ MSO2(1− ys) s ∈ S (11)
eSs −
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eSO2i g
s
ti ≥ −MSO2(1− ys) s ∈ S (12)
eSs ≤ MSO2ys s ∈ S (13)
Let consider now a solution g,y satisfying Eq. (8) - (13). Then, for any given
probability level γ and emission limit SO2, the conditional emission at risk CEaRSO2γ
associated to g,y is deﬁned as the expectation of the SO2 emissions for those scenarios
exceeding SO2:
CEaRSO2γ =
1∑
s∈S
P sys
∑
s∈S
P seSs
Then, the following risk-limiting constraint allows to control the amount by which the
expectation of the violating emissions CEaRSO2γ surpasses the limit SO2:
CEaRSO2γ ≤ (1 + β)SO2
where the parameter β ≥ 0 (usually< 1), the violation factor, represents the maximum
permitted violation as a fraction of the emission limit SO2. The last inequality ensures
that, in case that emissions are above the limit, the expected violation will be, on the
average, less than a fraction β of SO2. Note that when β = 0 no scenario can exceed
the emission limit, irrespective of the value of γ. In order to incorporate the last two
equations in a mathematical programming model it is convenient to combine them in
the following single linear inequality:∑
s∈S
P seSs ≤ (1 + β)SO2
∑
s∈S
P sys (14)
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f(Emissions)
CEaR
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γ
Emissions
SO2
Figure 2: Graphical representation of CEaR concept.
It is worth mentioning that the value SO2 imposed by the NERP plays the role of
the VaR level in the classical CVaR deﬁnition. The deﬁnition of CEaRSO2γ is illus-
trated graphically in Fig. 2 where f(Emissions) represents the probability density
function of the SO2 emissions.
Similarly to what has been done in the case of SO2 emissions, it is possible to
formulate the NOx CEaR’s risk constraints through the following set of constraints:
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eNOxi g
s
ti −NOx ≤ MNOxzs s ∈ S (15)
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eNOxi g
s
ti −NOx ≥ MNOx(zs − 1) s ∈ S (16)
∑
s∈S
P szs ≤ γ (17)
eNs −
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eNOxi g
s
ti ≤ MNOx(1− zs) s ∈ S (18)
eNs −
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
eNOxi g
s
ti ≥ −MNOx(1− zs) s ∈ S (19)
eNs ≤ MNOxzs s ∈ S (20)∑
s∈S
P seNs ≤ (1 + β)NOx
∑
s∈S
P szs (21)
The set of variables zs and eNs, and parameter MNOx are deﬁned analogously to
ys, eSs and MSO2 respectively.
2.3. Optimal day-ahead market bid model with emission risk constraints
We are now ready to extend the basic optimal day-ahead market bid model pre-
sented in section 2.1 with the Conditional Emission at Risk formulation of the national
emission reduction plan developed in section 2.2. The resulting optimal day-ahead
market bid model with emission risk (DAMB-ER)γ,β can be expressed through the
following mathematical optimization problem:
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(DAMB-ER)γ,β
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max h(u, cu, cd, g, p, b, f)
s.t. :
Eq. (1a)− (1d) FC and BC
Eq. (2a)− (2d) Day-ahead market
Eq. (3a)− (3b) Total generation
Eq. (4) Unit commitment
Eq. (8)− (14) CEaRSO2γ ≤ (1 + β)SO2
Eq. (15)− (21) CEaRNOxγ ≤ (1 + β)NOx
Problem (DAMB-ER)γ,β is a mixed, continuous-binary concave quadratic maxi-
mization problem with linear constraints with a well deﬁned global optimal solution.
3. Case Study
The model (DAMB-ER)γ,β developed in the previous section depends parametri-
cally on the conﬁdence probability γ and the violation factor β. The different com-
binations of values of γ and β between this two extreme cases provides information
that will be used in this section to asses the impact of the emission limits onto the
optimal generation bid and the expected proﬁts. Model (DAMB-ER)γ,β has been im-
plemented with the AMPL modeling language [27] and solved with CPLEX 12.4 [28]
(mipgap=0.01) over a Fuji RX200 S6 (2 x CPUs Intel Xeon X5680 six core - 12
threads 3.33 GHz, 64Gb RAM), taking advantage of the multithreading capabilities of
CPLEX (threads=20).
3.1. Data set
This study uses the same set of 50 scenarios generated in [29] for the random day-
ahead market spot prices λD as the result of the application of a scenario reduction al-
gorithm [30] to the complete set of historic data available from June 2007 to May 2010
available at the website of the Independent Iberian Market Operator OMIE [31]. The
generation units of this study correspond to four thermal units and two combined cycle
units currently operating in the MIBEL, and its technical characteristics are shown in
Table 1 and 2. Table 3 shows the number, energy and price of the bilateral and future
contracts. All data related with SO2 and NOx can be obtained from Table 4. The emis-
sion limits SO2 and NOx derive from the National Emission Reduction Plan [4]. The
SO2 and NOx emissions rates shown in Table 4 correspond to the values published by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Emission [32] for coal thermal units.
Further details can be obtained from [33].
3.2. Impact of the NERP in the expected proﬁts: parameterized efﬁcient frontier
As mentioned earlier, the risk constrained model (DAMB-ER)γ,β deﬁnes a family
of problems parameterized by the risk factors γ and β that can be used to asses the de-
pendence of expected returns with the risk level. The efﬁcient frontier (Fig. 3) deﬁnes
the maximum expected proﬁt that can be achieved by a GenCo for a given risk level,
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Table 1: Operational Characteristics of the Thermal Units
I cbi cli cqi P i P i st0i coni coffi toni , toffi
e e/MWh e/MWh2 MW MW hr e e hr
1 159.24 42.55 0.016 160.0 350.0 +3 435.09 435.09 3
2 901.70 59.38 0.038 250.0 563.2 +1 1307.70 1307.70 3
3 344.68 30.41 0.038 160.0 370.7 –1 462.07 462.07 3
4 322.04 60.04 0.032 160.0 364.1 +1 682.04 682.04 3
Table 2: Operational Characteristics of the Combined Cycle Units
CCGT P cbi cli cqi P i P i st0i coni toni toffi
e e/MWh e/MWh2 MW MW hr e hr hr
1 5 151.08 50.37 0.023 160.0 350.0 –2 803.75 2 3
1 6 224.21 32.50 0.035 250.0 563.2 –2 412.80 2 3
2 7 163.11 55.58 0.019 90.0 350.0 –3 320.50 2 3
2 8 245.32 31.10 0.022 220.0 700.0 –3 510.83 2 3
Table 3: Characteristics of Futures and Bilateral Contracts
j LBCj,t=1...24 λ
BC
j,t=1...24 L
FC
j,t=1...24 λ
FC
j,t=1...24
MW e/MWh MW e/MWh
1 164 43,35 120 45,6
2 50 43,35 120 46,1
3 150 43,35 120 51,2
Table 4: Daily emission limits data and thermal unit’s emissions data
SO2 NOx e
SO2
i e
NOx
i
kg/day kg/day kg/MWh kg/MWh
3.900 11.460 0.7848 1.368
14
deﬁned in our model by the two parameters γ and β (actually, the efﬁcient frontier is
an ”efﬁcient surface” in our case). It can be observed in Fig. 3 that as γ increases,
emissions may exceed the limit with greater probability and consequently the expected
proﬁt increases. Moreover, for any given conﬁdence probability γ if the average per-
centage at which emissions exceeds the limit is increased (i.e. if β increases), then the
expected value of the proﬁts increases accordingly. There are two extreme cases in Fig.
3
• The bottommost, ﬂat, curve associated to γ = 0 that corresponds to the most
restrictive optimization problem (DAMB-ER)0,β where no scenario is allowed to
violate the limit (being therefore irrelevant the value of β). It is worth mentioning
that this case is equivalent to the base model (DAMB-FBC) plus the emission
constraints (6)-(7).
• The topmost curve associated to γ = 1 that corresponds to the less restrictive
optimization problem (DAMB-ER)1,β where any scenario is allowed to violate
the emission limit by an amount not greater, on the average, than a fraction β
of the maximum emission. The optimal solution of the limiting case β → ∞,
or β = 1 in practice, (DABM-ER)1,1, coincides with the base model (DAMB-
FBC).
The economical information provided by the parameterized efﬁcient frontier in Fig. 3
is an example of how model (DAMB-ER)γ,β can be used by GenCo as a tool to asses
several decisions related with the electricity generation under NERP regulations. An
example of this would be to determine the convenience of the installation of a SO2 and
NOx capture technology with a given capacity and fault probability γ, by comparing
the cost of the installation with the increase in the expected proﬁts between the zero-
risk case (DAMB-ER)0,0 and the case (DAMB-ER)γ,β with a violation β representing
the capacity of the capture device.
3.3. Impact of the NERP in the optimal generation bid
The purpose of this section is to study in detail the effect of the risk constraints in
the optimal generation bid. The study will be based on the comparison of the optimal
solution of the original problem (DAMB-FBC), where no emission limits is consid-
ered, with the optimal solution of problem (DAMB-ER)0.3,0.15, as a representative
element of the parameterized family (DAMB-ER)γ,β . The optimal solution of prob-
lem (DAMB-ER)0.3,0.15 is such that the expected matched generation in the day-ahead
market will violate the NERP limits with a probability of 0.3, with an expected viola-
tion lesser than a 15% of the emissions limits. The dimensions and execution time of
both problems are indicated in Table 5
Table 6 depicts the expected value of the SO2 and NOx emissions, at the op-
timal solution of the two cases. The reduction of the SO2 and NOx emissions is
36.4% and 51.6% respectively, with a decrease in the expected proﬁts of just a 2.9%.
It is interesting to mention that the expected SO2 emission at the optimal solution
of model (DAMB-ER)0.3,0.15 (3.903 kg/day) is slightly greater than the NERP limit
(3.900 kg/day), which doesn’t represent any inconsistency as the considered conﬁdent
probability, γ = 0.3, is greater than zero.
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Figure 3: Parameterized efﬁcient CEaR frontier of the problem (DAMB-ER)γ,β ,
showing the change in the value of the expected proﬁts as a function of parame-
ters γ and β. The different curves corresponds, from bottom to top, to the val-
ues γ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 1}. Over each one of these curves, the dots de-
notes the computed optimal expected value of the problems (DAMB-ER)γ,β for β ∈
{0, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075, 0.1, 0.125, 0.15, 0.175, 0.2, 1.0}.
Table 5: Characteristics of the optimization problems
Variables
Cases Continuous Binary Constraints Exec. time
(DAMB-FBC) 20.160 200 49.458 360 sec.
(DAMB-ER)0.3,0.15 20.260 300 49.962 48 min.
Table 6: Expected daily emissions and proﬁt variation
E[SO2] E[NOx] EλD [profit]
kg/day kg/day e
(DAMB-FBC) 6.139 14.665 469.597
(DAMB-ER)0.3,0.15 3.903 7.104 455.757
Variation -36.4% -51.6% -2.9%
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Table 7: Total expected energy production
(DAMB-FBC) (DAMB-ER)0.3,0.15 Difference
MWh MWh MWh
Thermal 1 3301.4 448.0 -2853.4 (-86%)
Thermal 2 500.0 500.0 0.0 (0%)
Thermal 3 5030.2 3701.4 -1328.8 (-26%)
Thermal 4 320.0 320.0 0.0 (0%)
Total thermal 9151.5 4969 -4182.1 (-46%)
CCGT 1 4973.3 5617.8 644.4 (+13%)
CCGT 2 6829.4 8766.7 1937.3 (+28%)
Total CCGT 11802.7 14384.4 2581.7 (+22%)
Total thermal+CCGT 20954.3 19353.9 -1600.4 (-8%)
The effect of the NERP regulation on the aggregated daily expected energy gen-
eration of each unit can be observed in Table 7. The results show that under NERP
regulation:
• The total expected production is reduced by 1600.4MWh (-8%), with a reduc-
tion of 4182.1MWh (-46%) of the thermal units’ production and an increase of
2581.7MWh (+22%) of the CCGTs’ production.
• The reduction in the thermal units is concentrated in thermal unit 1, which is
switched off as soon as possible, with a decrease of 2853.4MWh (-86%) and
thermal unit 3, which is kept in operation, but decreasing by 1328MWh (-26%)
its expected production.
• The generation of the CCGT units increases by 644.4MWh for unit 1 (+13%)
and 1937MWh for unit 2 (+22%).
Fig. 4 shows the impact of the emission risk constraints over the individual unit
commitment of each generation unit, together with the optimal dispatch of the bilateral
and future contracts among each generation unit for the (DAMB-FBC) problem (left
column) and (DAMB-ER)0.3,0.15 (right column). The blue area corresponds to the
energy allocated to the bilateral contracts (variable bti); the green area is the energy of
the price acceptance bid qti that includes the energy allocated to the futures contracts
ftij . Finally, the yellow area is, for each generation i and period t, the expected value
of the matched energy in the day-ahead market
∑
s∈S
P spsti. Comparing the generation
proﬁles in Fig. 4 it is clear how the NERP regulation is affecting the unit commitment:
all coal thermal generators (high-emission units) are shut-down early, except thermal
unit 3, which is maintained in operation to satisfy future contract 3 (in the absence of
future contracts, thermal unit 3 would have been kept shut-down all day long).
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Figure 4: Comparison of the unit commitment for models (DAMB-FBC) (left) and
(DAMB-ER)0.3,0.15 (Right): bti (scheduled energy for bilateral contract, blue), qti
(price acceptant bid, green). In yellow the expected value of matched energy. For
the CC units, dark colors are for pseudo-unit 1 and light colors for pseudo-unit 2.
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4. Conclusions
Generation companies have to decide the daily generation bid to be submitted to
the day-ahead electricity market, where, in Spain, a total of more than 30 millions of
Euros are negotiated daily. The GenCo’s optimal generation bid is aimed at both max-
imizing the expected proﬁt and abiding by the different National Emission Reduction
Plan of each country. The new competitive and environmentally constrained electricity
supply industry requires new mathematical and computing tools to ensure both com-
petitiveness with other generating companies in the electricity market and secondly,
environmental protection by limiting damaging emission into the atmosphere. Trying
to advance in that direction this work proposes a new two-stage stochastic program-
ming model to cope with the optimal generation bid to the day-ahead electricity mar-
ket of a GenCo operating a pool of thermal and combined cycle generation units and a
given set of futures and bilateral contracts to be settled next day. The model takes into
account the MIBEL market rules and the SO2 and NOx emission limits of the current
Spanish NERP regulation through a new measure of risk called Conditional Emission-
at-Risk (CEaR). CEaR allows the formulation of a family of models (DAMB-ER)γ,β
parameterized by the emission risk level deﬁned by γ and β which gives a ﬂexible tool
to asses a wide range of decisions related with the electricity generation under NERP
regulations. The computational experiments performed with real data of the Spanish
wholesale electricity market provides the optimal dispatch of each individual thermal
and CCGT unit among the different energy contracts an the day-ahead market. The nu-
merical results show that, for a given representative risk level, the SO2 and NOx NERP
obligations can be met by reducing the expected total energy production by 8%, with
a 3% decrease in the expected proﬁts. This reduction of the total energy production is
unevenly distributed among the generation technologies, with a 46% decrease of the
thermal production against a 22% increase of the CCGT generation, conﬁrming the
central role of the CCGT technology in an environmental friendly energy production
system.
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